IN Brief:
- The Court of Appeal dismissed Morris Homes’ challenge to an existing off-site carbon-mitigation planning obligation.
- Zero Carbon Hub’s dissolution did not prevent the remaining parties from using the agreement’s project-selection criteria.
- The ruling concerns the useful-purpose test under section 106A, not a new planning approval or offsetting requirement.
Morris Homes has failed in a Court of Appeal challenge to a planning obligation requiring financial contributions towards off-site carbon mitigation associated with a residential development in Peterborough. The judgment, handed down on 17 November 2026, found that the agreed obligation remained capable of serving a useful purpose even though a specialist organisation named in the arrangements had ceased trading and been dissolved.
The proceedings involved Morris Homes Limited and Morris Homes (Midlands) Limited, the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, and Peterborough City Council. In [2026] EWCA Civ 1465, Lewison LJ gave the substantive judgment, with Zacaroli and Lieven LJJ agreeing. The court dismissed the developers’ appeal and upheld the earlier refusal to discharge the obligation under section 106A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.
The obligation had been agreed in connection with a revised residential planning permission. Rather than achieving net zero carbon emissions entirely within the development, the scheme required payments to support qualifying carbon-reduction measures elsewhere. The arrangements identified eligible projects through criteria covering their type, location, and minimum carbon reductions, with approval to be managed by a project board.
That board was intended to include representatives of Morris Homes, the council, and Zero Carbon Hub Limited. The hub was a specialist body involved in the development of approaches to lower-carbon housing, but it subsequently ceased trading and was dissolved. Morris Homes had not paid the required contributions and argued that the absence of a named board participant made the approval machinery unworkable, leaving the obligation without a useful purpose.
An inspector refused Morris Homes’ application to discharge the obligation, and the Planning Court dismissed the ensuing challenge in December 2025. The Court of Appeal has now upheld that result. Although the three-member board could no longer meet in precisely the form anticipated when the agreement was signed, the judges examined whether the contribution could still fund eligible carbon-mitigation projects under the agreement’s substantive criteria.
Section 106 obligations are used to secure measures related to development that cannot be delivered through a planning condition alone. An agreement may require land use restrictions, specified works, or financial contributions, with separate provisions governing the process for approving projects and releasing funds. The agreement’s administrative provisions do not necessarily determine whether the underlying obligation still serves its planning purpose. That distinction becomes important when a named organisation is restructured, dissolved or no longer willing to participate.
Section 106A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 provides a route to seek modification or discharge of certain obligations. An obligation that no longer serves a useful purpose can be discharged; one that would serve that purpose equally well with modifications may be modified. In Peterborough, the question was whether the existing contribution arrangement remained useful despite the missing project-board member, rather than whether a different offsetting scheme might be preferable.
The Court of Appeal examined the criteria available for choosing suitable projects. The incorporated material and the obligation itself contained sufficient objective requirements to guide selection, while the project board could establish its own procedures and refer disagreements to an expert determination mechanism. The council remained responsible for holding and spending the contributions. Those features gave the arrangement a workable route to implementation without relying on Zero Carbon Hub to exercise a unique discretionary or veto power.
Zero Carbon Hub brought specialist expertise to the intended approval process, but the agreement did not reserve a decisive vote or exclusive technical determination to that body. Its dissolution therefore did not remove the objective criteria against which eligible projects could be assessed. The remaining participants could continue to give effect to the agreed mechanism. The outcome would not necessarily be the same where an agreement expressly made a named expert’s decision a condition that no other participant could satisfy.
The developers also challenged the adequacy of the planning inspector’s reasons. The court held that the principal disputed issues had been answered sufficiently when the decision was read fairly as a whole. A tentative observation about the possibility of a court appointing a replacement board member was not necessary to the finding that the obligation itself already contained workable criteria and procedures.
The offsetting arrangement belongs to an earlier period of housing energy policy, when the relationship between on-site standards and additional off-site measures was being developed. Changes in policy or the disappearance of a supporting organisation do not automatically extinguish an existing planning obligation. The enforceability of another agreement would still depend on its precise wording, including whether the promised outcome is possible and whether its approval procedure can operate without rewriting the bargain.
Developers regularly revisit planning agreements when land changes hands, designs are altered, or financing is restructured. An existing payment obligation can affect the cost plan long after the body originally expected to advise on it has disappeared. Reviewing such provisions requires a distinction between the outcome the contribution is meant to deliver and the committee or administrative process established to choose projects. Where a procedure remains workable against defined criteria, a missing participant will not necessarily provide a route to discharge.
The appeal did not grant new permission for construction or change the payment timetable. The inspector’s refusal to discharge the Peterborough obligation remains in force, subject to any later compliance or legal steps taken under the agreement. Morris Homes must therefore address the existing carbon-mitigation requirement rather than treating Zero Carbon Hub’s dissolution as having cancelled it.



