Housing Delivery Test exposes North West shortfalls

Housing Delivery Test exposes North West shortfalls

Three North West councils now face tougher housing delivery consequences. Stockport, Lancaster, and Chorley each delivered below 75% of assessed need.


IN Brief:

  • The 2025 Housing Delivery Test supersedes the delayed 2024 measurement for planning decisions.
  • Stockport recorded 43%, Lancaster 48%, and Chorley 63% of their assessed housing requirements.
  • All three face action plans, a 20% land-supply buffer, and the presumption in favour of sustainable development.

The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government has published the delayed 2024 and 2025 Housing Delivery Tests together, with Stockport, Lancaster, and Chorley all falling below the threshold that triggers the strongest planning consequences for housing under-delivery.

The 2025 measurement supersedes the 2024 figures for decision-making and assesses housing delivery across the three financial years from 2022/23 to 2024/25. It compares net additional homes delivered with the number of homes assessed as required over the same period.

Stockport recorded the weakest result of the three authorities, delivering 1,457 homes against a requirement of 3,408 for a Housing Delivery Test score of 43%.

Lancaster delivered 612 homes against a requirement of 1,271, producing a 48% result. Chorley completed 986 homes against a requirement of 1,553, giving the authority a score of 63%.

All three results sit below 75%, meaning the authorities must prepare action plans, apply a 20% buffer when assessing housing land supply, and operate with the presumption in favour of sustainable development engaged for relevant housing decisions.

The publication is unusual because two annual tests have been released simultaneously. The government delayed the 2024 and 2025 measurements while planning reforms and changes to the calculation were considered, and has now restored the latest test as the operative assessment.

For developers, the 2025 figures matter more than the historical 2024 exercise. Land promotion, planning strategy, appeals, and housing-land-supply arguments now need to be considered against the latest measurement rather than the older test that had remained in force during the delay.

Stockport’s 43% result is particularly significant. The borough delivered fewer than half the homes identified as required across the assessment period, despite strong development pressure across Greater Manchester and continuing demand for housing within the wider city region.

Lancaster’s 48% score also represents a substantial planning consequence. The authority’s position demonstrates how quickly the formal status of a housing market can change when delayed measurements are brought up to date, particularly where delivery falls across more than one year.

Chorley performed better than the other two but remains below the 75% threshold. Its 63% result keeps the authority within the strongest consequence category even though it delivered a materially larger share of its assessed requirement.

The presumption in favour of sustainable development can improve the prospects of some residential applications, but it is not an automatic consent mechanism. Proposals still have to address highways, drainage, protected land, infrastructure, environmental constraints, design, viability, and other material planning considerations.

The test also exposes the difference between permission and delivery. Housing Delivery Test scores are based on completed homes rather than the number of applications approved, so authorities cannot correct a weak result simply by increasing the volume of consented land.

A scheme can have planning permission and still fail to reach construction because of infrastructure costs, finance, remediation, abnormal ground conditions, market conditions, legal agreements, or delays in discharging conditions.

For contractors, that distinction limits how far a poor Housing Delivery Test result can be treated as an immediate workload signal. A more favourable planning balance may allow additional sites to progress, but construction opportunity appears only when those schemes move into detailed design, procurement, and mobilisation.

The same regional results show varying degrees of pressure elsewhere. Manchester recorded 75%, while Trafford achieved 83%, meaning both face consequences below the strongest category. Liverpool and Bolton recorded 87%, still requiring action plans but remaining above the thresholds that bring the 20% buffer and tilted balance into play.

Those differences illustrate why the North West cannot be treated as a single housing market. Viability, land availability, house prices, apartment economics, Green Belt constraints, infrastructure, and local plan status can differ sharply between neighbouring authorities.

The government has also updated the Housing Delivery Test rule book alongside publication of the results, including changes connected with transitional arrangements and the treatment of unmet need. The 2025 figures therefore represent the current formal position rather than simply a delayed publication of unchanged calculations.

For Stockport, Lancaster, and Chorley, the immediate effect is a tougher planning environment for authorities seeking to resist housing proposals where delivery is already below assessed need. Developers may gain additional planning leverage, but that does not resolve the commercial and technical barriers that have helped create the low delivery figures in the first place.

The next test will measure occupied homes again, not improved planning rhetoric. If additional permissions generated under the current consequences remain stalled by infrastructure, finance, or viability, the percentages will simply expose the same gap between policy ambition and physical construction one year later.